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One of the many dif￿ culties presented by Book Z of AristotleÕs Metaphy-
sics concerns the account of de￿ nition in chapters 10 and 11, an account
which has been interpreted in a variety of ways. I believe that confusion
on  this  issue  has  resulted  from  commentatorsÕ  failure  to  acknowledge
AristotleÕs  distinction  between  de￿ nitions  of  composites  of  form  and
matter, which must specify material parts, and de￿ nitions of forms alone,
which  must  not  mention  material  parts  – a  distinction  mirrored  in  De
Anima I.1Õs discussion of the de￿ nition of composite psychological events
and  their  forms.  Hence,  when  Meta.  Z.11  explains  that  ÒsomeÓ  items
(1036b23)  cannot  be de￿ ned without  reference to material parts, instead
of taking this as a remark on the de￿ nition of composite substances, com-
mentators often conclude  that Aristotle holds  that  certain forms must  be
de￿ ned with reference to material parts. 
In their splendid  commentary on  Book  Z of AristotleÕs Metaphysics,
1
Michael  Frede  and  GŸnther  Patzig  have  argued  that  the  discussion  of
de￿ nition  in  chapters  10  and  11  deals  with  one  kind  of de￿ nition  only,
viz. the de￿ nition of forms. While they do not think that the de￿ nition of
a form makes an explicit reference to matter, they nevertheless assert that
AristotleÕs statement in Z.11 that Òthe animal is perceptible and cannot be
de￿ ned  without  change,  nor  therefore without  its  parts in a certain con-
ditionÓ (1036b28-30) is a claim about de￿ ning forms.2 According to them,
AristotleÕs point is not that such forms are de￿ ned with an explicit refer-
ence to matter, but rather that such de￿ nitions of forms Òmust make clear
the inner connection between form and matter.Ó3 So if an animalÕs form
is de￿ ned by de￿ ning  its  soul,4 the de￿ nition  will make clear that inner
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1 Aristoteles ÒMetaphysikÓ: Text, †bersetzung und Kommentar(Munich,1988),vol. II.
2 Frede and Patzig, pp. 209-13. 
3 Frede and Patzig, p. 212. Cf. M. Frede, ÒThe De￿ nition of Sensible Substance in
Metaphysics Z,Ó in P. Pellegrin (ed.), Biologie, logique et m￿taphysique (Paris, 1990),
pp. 117-21. 
4 They alter the text at 1036b28 from aÞsyhtñn to aÞsy®tikon.connection  by  implying  that such a soul cannot  exist apart from certain
bodily organs in which it must be realized.
I believe that this interpretation  makes three mistakes. (1) Aristotle is
not claiming that de￿ nitions of forms allude to matter in the indirect way
suggested.  (2)  In  Z  Aristotle  does  distinguish  two  kinds  of  de￿ nitions:
de￿ nitions of forms and de￿ nitions of composites.5 (3) Aristotle does think
that de￿ nitions of composites make explicit reference to the matter of the
composites. Here I am concerned primarily with (2) and (3).
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The position of Frede and Patzig is partly based on the claim that, while
the distinction between the de￿ nition of the form and the de￿ nition of the
concrete or composite substance may be made elsewhere by Aristotle, it
is nowhere to be found in Meta. Z and hence cannot  be used to explain
Z.11Õs apparent  claim (1036b21-32)  that some things must be de￿ ned in
terms of their material parts.7 But in fact, I will argue, the distinction  is
made elsewhere in Z, for example in  Z.10, 1035a22-23,  where Aristotle
says that material parts will not be mentioned  in the de￿ nition of forms
but  will be  mentioned  in  the  de￿ nition  of  composites.8 Likewise,  when
Aristotle shortly  afterward (1035a28-29)  refers to entities without  matter
Òwhose de￿ nitions are of the form aloneÓ the implication  is that entities
with matter have de￿ nitions that are not of the form alone.
9
I will begin my discussion by concentrating on 1035a22-23 and its sur-
rounding  context in Z.10. 
Z.10 starts by raising the question of whether the de￿ nition of a thing
should contain the de￿ nition of its parts (1034b20-28). Aristotle begins to
5 In fact, three kinds of de￿ nition need to be distinguished. See below, n. 28. 
6 Some other passages outside of Z.10 and 11 which distinguish between de￿nitions
of composites that  do refer to matter and  de￿ nitions of  forms  that do not  refer to
matter: Meta.  1025b30-1026a6,  1033a1-5, b24-26, 1043a14-18, 1064a19-28; Phys.
194a1-7; De Caelo 277b30-278a6, 23-25; De Anima 403a29-b16.
Previous criticism of  the  position of Frede  and Patzig on  de￿ nition in  Z.10-11 
can  be  found in  D.  Morrison, ÒSome  Remarks  on  De￿ nition in  Metaphysics Z,Ó 
in  P.  Pellegrin (ed.), Biologie, logique et  m￿taphysique (Paris, 1990), pp.  131-44;  
J. Whiting, ÒMetasubstance,Ó Philosophical Review C (1991), pp. 626-31; D. Bostock,
AristotleÕs Metaphysics: Books Z and H (Oxford, 1994); M. Ferejohn, ÒThe De￿ nition
of Generated Composites in AristotleÕs Metaphysics,Ó in T. Scaltsas, D. Charles, and
M.L. Gill (eds.), Unity, Identity, and Explanation in AristotleÕ s Metaphysics, (Oxford,
1994), pp. 291-318.
7 Frede and Patzig, p. 211. 
8 Cf. Morrison, ÒSome Remarks on De￿ nition in Metaphysics Z,Ó pp. 136-37. 
9 Cf. D. Bostock, AristotleÕs Metaphysics: Books Z and H, p. 150.
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1035a9)  which depend  on the kind  of thing  we are talking  about.  If we
are speaking about a form, then a part is a part of a form. If we are speak-
ing about a concrete, sensible object, a composite of form and matter, then
a part is to be understand as a material part of the object. 
Now, chapter 10 occurs in a section of Z (4-11) which is devoted to the
topic  of  essence  (1029b1-13),  and  since  Aristotle  identi￿ es  essence  and
form,
10 AristotleÕs focus  in  chapter  10  is on  whether  the  de￿ nition  of a
form should contain the de￿ nition of its parts. So, after drawing his dis-
tinction  between kinds  of part, Aristotle goes on to explain  (1035a9-22)
that the de￿ nition of a form should contain the de￿ nition of the parts of
the  form  but  should  not  contain  the  de￿ nition  of  the  parts  of  the  com-
posite, i.e. its material parts.
On Frede and PatzigÕs translation, Aristotle then goes on to make the
following claim in 1035a22-23:
(1) So with some things the de￿ nition of such parts will be contained <in their
de￿ nition>,
(2) (a) whereas with others it must not be contained, (b) unless it deals with the
de￿ nition of a thing in which matter is included.
11
I believe that in (1) Aristotle shifts attention from the de￿ nition of forms
to the de￿ nition  of composites  of form and matter and asserts that such
de￿ nitions should mention the matter of those composites.
Frede and Patzig claim, by contrast, that the Òsuch partsÓ mentioned in
(1) refer to parts of the form.12 Thus, they maintain, appealing to a differ-
ence Aristotle has just pointed  out (1035a9-22),  (1) says that the de￿ ni-
tions  of parts  of  a  form should  be  present  in the  de￿ nition  of one  kind 
of  concrete  object  – those  that  are  like  syllables.  Then  the  ÒothersÓ  of 
(2) refers to composites of form and matter such as circles, and (2) says
that the de￿ nitions of the material parts of such composites should not be
mentioned in the de￿ nition of the forms of these composites.
Dif￿ culty for Frede and Patzig* arises from the fact that they construe
both (1) and (2) as speaking  about composites, though different kinds of
10 Meta. 1032b1-2, 1036a16-19, 1037a33-b4, 1043b2-4. 
11 Ò(1) Bei manchen Dingen wird also die Formel von Teilen von dieser Art (in
ihrer Formel) enthalten sein, (2) bei anderen dagegen darf sie nicht enthalten sein, es
sei denn, es handle sich um die Formel einer Sache, bei der die Materie miteinbezo-
gen ist.Ó
12 Frede and Patzig, p. 180.
13 *See their discussion of this line in Frede and Patzig, pp. 178-79. 
FREDE AND PATZIG ON DEFINITION 285composites. This causes two problems. First, they construe (2)(a) as mak-
ing a claim about composites such as circles: the de￿ nitions of such com-
posites do not refer to their material parts. What, then, can they do with
(b)? It states an exception to the claim made in (a) for a certain class of
cases:  those  in  which  the  de￿ ned  entity  includes  matter.  The entities  in
question  can only  be composites.  The entities referred to in (a), as con-
strued by Frede and Patzig, are also composites. Why then would Aristotle
contrast the entities mentioned in (b) with the entities mentioned in (a) by
calling them composites?
Secondly,  on  Frede  and  PatzigÕs  account,  (a)  states  that  reference to
material parts such as the segments of a circle should not be included in
de￿ nitions of forms of composites such as circles. Since (b) clearly says
that what does not hold in the cases mentioned in (a) does hold in certain
other cases, Frede and Patzig must understand (b) to say that reference to
material parts such as  segments must be mentioned  in the de￿ nitions  of
some composites.  But this  is precisely  what  they claim Aristotle  rejects
for all de￿ nitions. Furthermore (see the preceding paragraph), (b) speci￿ es
the class of cases in which reference to material parts such as segments
must be mentioned in de￿ nitions  as those in which the de￿ niendum is a
composite. So it appears that Frede and Patzig must construe Aristotle as
making this claim for all composites.
Another  apparent  problem  for  Frede  and  Patzig  is  that  they  construe 
(1) so that the things  in  question  are concrete  objects such as  syllables,
while the parts  in  question  are parts of a form. But  then  since  it is,  on
their view, the de￿ nition of composites that is at issue, (1) appears to be
speaking  of  formal  parts  as  parts  of  the  composite.  But  nowhere  in  the
preceding passage, and nowhere in Z.10-11, does Aristotle speak of parts
of  a  form  as  being  parts  of  a  concrete  object.  Rather,  when  he  distin-
guished kinds of parts in 1034b32-1035a9, he pointed out on the one hand
the parts of a form and on the other hand the matter of a composite object
which is a part of that composite. 
It  might  be  suggested  that  Frede  and  Patzig  need  not  take  (1)  to  be 
saying  that  the  Òsuch  parts,Ó i.e.  the  parts  of  the  form,  are parts  of the
composite. Rather, one might suggest, they could construe (1) to be say-
ing  merely  that  the  de￿ nition  of composites  must  mention  Òsuch  partsÓ
without at the same time implying that these formal parts are parts of the
composite.  So  while  the  subject  of  the  sentence  (tÇn  m¢n)  is  composite 
substances  which are like syllables,  the Òsuch partsÓ that (1) goes on to
mention  are not  to  be  taken  as  parts  of  those  composites but  merely as
parts of the form which must be mentioned in de￿ ning those composites.
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construe the next sentence (1035a24-25)  rules this out. For they take the
parts mentioned in (1) to be parts of the composites into which those com-
posites perish.14
Further, Frede and Patzig are claiming that the kinds of parts at issue
in (1) and (2) are different: in (1), they hold, parts of the form are in ques-
tion while in (2) material parts are in question.  But the parts in question
must  be  the  same  in  (1)  and  (2).  In  the  Greek,  the  subject  of  the  ￿ rst
clause of (2) must  be  supplied  from (1) – õ tÇn toioætvn merÇn lñgow –
and so whatever  the  ÒsuchÓ parts are that (1) is talking  about,  (2) must
be  talking  about  the  same  kinds  of parts.  Hence,  (1)  is saying  that  the
de￿ nition of the same sorts of parts which according to (2) are not men-
tioned  in  the  de￿ nition  of  certain  items are mentioned  in  the  de￿ nition 
of certain other items. 
What sorts of parts, then, are at issue in (1) and (2)? It seems that they
must be material parts. (1)Õs use of the phrase Òsuch partsÓ indicates that
Aristotle has just been speaking  about them. And what he has just been
speaking  about  for  the  previous  eleven  lines  (1035a12-22)  is  material
parts, explaining that they are not parts of the form. So another dif￿ culty
with Frede and PatzigÕs view that it is parts of the form which – according
to  (1)  – are  to  be  mentioned  in  de￿ nitions,  is  that  they  must  construe 
Aristotle as speaking of material parts for eleven lines (1035a12-22), then
refer to  Òsuch  partsÓ  in  (1)  (1035a22),  but  mean  by  the  latter  phrase 
not  material  parts  but  parts  of  the  form  which  were  last  mentioned  in
1035a10.
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Further  problems  are  created  for  Frede  and  Patzig  by  what  follows
1035a22-23,  in  1035a24-b1.  On  their  translation,  this  passage  says  the 
following:
a24 Because of this some things consist of things as principles into which they perish, 
while with other things that is not the case. Now, whatever is so constituted as to 
include form and matter, as the snub and the bronze circle, decomposes, when it 
perishes, into its material constituents, and the matter is a part of this thing. On 
14 Frede and Patzig, p. 180: ÒAristotle distinguishes two cases among things that
perish into something, to which he refers with ¦nia m¢n . . . ¦nia d¢ in a24-25 and with
tÇn m¢n . . . tÇn dÕ in a22-23: (i) things [tÇn m¢n, one kind of concrete object, e.g. a
syllable] that perish into parts [i.e. its letters] which at the same time are their prin-
ciples and therefore must occur in their formula. . . . The example for the ￿ rst case is
the syllable in its relation to the letters from which it is composed.. . .Ó 
15 Cf. D. Bostock, AristotleÕ s Metaphysics: Books Z and H, p. 150.
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exists without matter and whose de￿ nition is of form alone, that does not perish,
a30 either not at all or at least not in this way. Consequently these things are prin-
ciples and parts of those things, but neither parts nor principles of the form. And
for that reason the clay statue decomposes into clay, and the circle into earth 
and Callias into ￿ esh and bones, and further the circle into its segments. For there
b1 is a kind of circle in which matter is included.
Frede and Patzig do not have much to say about 1035a25-b1,  but here is
what they say about 1035a24-25:
Since ¦nia m¢n . . . ¦nia d¢ [Òsome things . . . other thingsÓ] in a24-25 stands in
essential parallel to tÇn m¢n . . . tÇn dÕ [Òsome things . . . othersÓ] in a22-23, the
reference is probably directed to the immediately preceding sentence. The state-
ment  a22-23 af￿ rms  that  there is  a  kind of  thing to  whose formula the  parts
belong essentially. From  this, our statement [sc. a24-25] draws the conclusion
that the parts into which such things perish are also at the same time principles
of the things [sc. the concrete objects] just because they do occur in its formula.
The emphasis is on Éw ￿rxÇn (Òas from their principlesÓ). . . .
Aristotle distinguishes two cases among things that perish into something, to
which he refers with ¦nia m¢n . . . ¦nia d¢ in a24-25 and with tÇn m¢n . . . tÇn dÕ
in a22-23: (i) things [concrete objects such as syllables] that  perish into parts
which at the same time are their principles and therefore must occur in their for-
mula; (ii) things [concrete objects such as circles] that perish into parts which
are not principles of them and therefore also cannot occur in the de￿ nition. The
example for the ￿ rst case is the syllable in its relation to the letters from which
it is composed, for the second case the circle in its relation to the segments.
Therefore from the fact that the syllable decomposes into its letters and these
are nevertheless parts of the formula of the syllable, one cannot draw the con-
clusion that, in general, whatever something decomposes into are  parts of  its 
formula. For in the case of material parts (m¡row . . . Éw ìlh,  a16-17), this does
not hold.
. . . . .
The difference ¦nia m¢n . . . ¦nia d¢ (and correspondingly tÇn m¢n . . . tÇn dÕ) refers
not to the  difference between form and  concrete object, but rather to  the two 
kinds of concrete object in relation to its parts. Correspondingly he distinguishes
between mere material parts and parts (cf. tÇn toioætvn merÇn, a22) such as let-
ters in relation to a syllable. Material parts are parts of the concrete object, but
therefore too in no way parts of the form of the concrete object (diñper oédƒ ¤n
toÝw lñgoiw, a21-22).
16
Interpreting 1035a22-b1  along these lines, the passage would  proceed as
follows:
16 Frede and Patzig, p. 180. 
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will contain the de￿ nition of such parts [i.e., parts of the form], while 
(2) the de￿ nition of other sorts of concrete objects such as circles (tÇn dÕ)
will not contain the de￿ nition of such parts [i.e., material parts].
a24-25: (1) Some  things such as syllables (¦nia m¢n)  perish into those things from
which they are composed as  principles (viz., because the  things into
which they perish are mentioned in their de￿ nition), but
(2) other things such as  circles (¦nia  d¢)  perish into parts which are not
principles of them (viz., because the things into which they perish are 
not mentioned in their de￿ nition).17
a25-30: (1) Composites of form and matter, such as the snub or the bronze circle,
perish into those material parts from which they are composed.
(2) Whatever things are not combined with matter but are without matter,
whose de￿ nitions are of  the  form  alone – these do  not  perish, either 
not at all or not in this way. 
a30-31: Consequently
(1) these material parts are parts and principles of those things [mentioned
in a25-30 (1)], but 
(2) these material parts are not parts or principles of the form.
a31-34: Because of this
(1) the clay  statue perishes into clay  and  the bronze statue perishes into
bronze and Callias perishes into ￿ esh and bones and the circle perishes
into its segments.
a. For there is a circle which is combined with matter.
There are at least two problems here for Frede and Patzig. 
1. Frede and Patzig must say that a22-23 (1) is talking about the parts
of the form of a syllable when it speaks of parts whose de￿ nition must be
mentioned  in the  de￿ nition  of the whole. It is certain that a22-23  (1) is
not talking about material parts of a syllable as the kinds of parts which
are mentioned in the de￿ nition of a form, since 1035a14-16 contrasts the
parts whose de￿ nition is mentioned in the de￿ nition of the whole with the
sensible,  material  parts.  And  1035a10-11  is explicit  that  it is the  letters
which are parts of the form that must be mentioned in the de￿ nition of a
syllable. 
Nor can they avoid  commitment to the proposition  that in a24-25  (1)
the kinds  of parts in question  are material parts since the parts in ques-
tion  are  parts  into  which  a composite  perishes.  Aristotle  does  not  think
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17 I believe it is clear that here Aristotle is not, as Frede and Patzig think, referring
to a kind of entity that perishes into elements that are not principles of such entities.
Rather, he is referring to a kind of entity that does not, properly speaking, perish at
all (1035a29-30). But I will assume the view of Frede and Patzig for now. that  a concrete  object  Òperishes  intoÓ parts  of its  form. A human  being
does not Òperish intoÓ or Òdecompose intoÓ the perceptive soul, the nutri-
tive soul, etc. If we take their example of a syllable, 1035a11 and 14-17
clearly distinguish  letters  which  are parts  of  the  form and  letters  which
are material parts of a composite syllable. 1035a14-17  mentions the par-
ticular  letters which  are the  perceptible,  material parts  of the  composite
syllable.  These are the  parts into  which  the  perceptible  syllable  divides,
and  just  as  Aristotle  says  that  a  particular  line  perishes  into  the  halves
into  which  it  divides  (1035a17-18),  so  the  individual  perceptible  let-
ters  into  which  a  composite  syllable  divides  are  the  parts  into  which  it
perishes.
Apart from this, it is unclear what could  be meant by saying  that the
composite syllable perishes into the letters that are parts of its form, and
Frede and Patzig make no attempt to explain.
Hence, Frede and Patzig cannot avoid saying that Aristotle slides from
speaking about formal parts in a22-23 (1) to speaking about material parts
of the syllable  in a24-25  (1), even though  a22-23  (1) is the justi￿ cation
for a24-25  (1), and even though  Aristotle has just (1034b2-1035a9)  em-
phasized the importance of distinguishing these two kinds of parts in order
to  answer  the  problem  about  the  parts  of  the  form  and  de￿ nition  with
which Z.10 is concerned.
2.  For  Frede  and  Patzig  there  is  a  certain  break  in  the  discussion  at
1035a25,  so that the discussion  divides into the two parts – 1035a22-25
and 1035a25-b3. The ￿ rst part is discussing two kinds of concrete object,
those such as the syllable whose parts occur in their de￿ nition and those
such as lines whose parts do not occur in their de￿ nition. However, while
1035a25-b3  also  discusses  two  kinds  of entity,  it  is  perfectly  clear  that
one  of the entities discussed  in this passage  is not any kind  of concrete
object but rather the form. Nor is there any unclarity about  the fact that
the other kind of entity is the substance that is a composite of form and
matter. 
According to Frede and Patzig, in the ￿ rst part – 1035a22-25 – the fol-
lowing claim was made about those concrete objects and their principles: 
The statement a22-23 af￿ rms that there is a kind of thing to whose de￿ nition
the parts essentially belong. From this, our statement [sc. a24-25] draws the con-
clusion that the parts into which such things perish are also at  the same time
principles of the things [sc. the concrete objects] just because they do occur in
its de￿ nition. The emphasis is on Éw ￿rxÇn (Òas from their principlesÓ). . . .
Aristotle distinguishes two cases among things that perish into something. . .:
(i) things that perish into parts which at the same time are their principles and
therefore must occur in their de￿ nition; (ii) things that perish into parts which
290 ROBERT HEINAMANare not principles of them and therefore also cannot occur in the de￿ nition. The
example for the ￿ rst case is the syllable in its relation to the letters from which
it is composed, for the second case the circle in its relation to the segments.
18
But now, in 1035a25-b3  Aristotle again af￿ rms that the parts into which
a certain kind of entity perishes are principles of such entities. However,
here he af￿ rms that composites of form and matter perish into their mate-
rial parts and that these material parts are principles of those composites
(1035a30).  On Frede and PatzigÕs interpretation  this seems to contradict
what has been said in 1035a22-25. 
Frede and  Patzig assert that in  1035a22-25  Aristotle maintains  that  a
concrete object perishes into certain parts as principles because those parts
are mentioned in the de￿ nition of their form. And the implication appears
to be, further, that when a concrete object such as a circle perishes into
parts which are not mentioned in the de￿ nition of its form (e.g. the seg-
ments of a circle), those parts are not principles of the composite. 
But here in 1035a25-b3  Aristotle mentions,  as examples of parts into
which  concrete  objects  perish,  parts  which  are also  principles of  those
concrete objects: the ￿ esh and bones  of a human being,  the bronze of a
circle, and the segments of a circle. This does not appear to make sense
on Frede and PatzigÕs interpretation. For they maintain that the ￿ esh and
bones  of a human being  are not mentioned  in  the  de￿ nition  of its  form
and that bronze is not mentioned in the de￿ nition of the form of a bronze
circle.  According  to  their  interpretation  of  1035a22-25,  AristotleÕs  con-
clusion should therefore be that the ￿ esh and bones into which a concrete
human being perishes are not principles of the human being; and that the
bronze into which a concrete bronze circle perishes is not a principle of
the circle. Furthermore, while Aristotle here af￿ rms that the segments into
which  a  concrete  circle  perishes  are principles  of  the  circle,  Frede  and
Patzig asserted that Aristotle just said, in 1035a22-25,  that the segments
into  which a circle perishes  are not  principles  of it on  the  grounds  that
such segments are not mentioned in the de￿ nition of the form of a circle.
Since  1035a25-b3Õs statement  about  segments  being  principles  of the
concrete circle that perishes into them is clear, it appears that it is Frede
and PatzigÕs claim about 1035a22-25  that must go.
Note how straightforward  our passage  is if (1) throughout  is taken to
refer to one of the kinds of entity distinguished  in 1034b32-1035a9,  viz.
18 Frede and Patzig, p. 180. My italics.
FREDE AND PATZIG ON DEFINITION 291composites in general, and (2) throughout is taken to refer to another one
of the kinds of entity distinguished in 1034b32-1035a9,  viz. forms.
19 Then
all of the problems mentioned above will disappear.
So already in Z.10, I believe, Aristotle distinguishes between de￿ nitions
of composites which refer to matter and de￿ nitions of forms which do not.
Likewise  in  Z.7,  1033a1-5  Aristotle  explains  that  the  de￿ nition  of  the
composite bronze sphere must mention bronze. These de￿ nitions that men-
tion  material parts of composites  also put in  an appearance  in Meta. H.
1043a5-11,  where  the  composite  house is  de￿ ned  as  stones and  wood
disposed  thus (plÛnyouw kaÜ jæla ÉdÜ keÛmena; cf. Z.11, 1036b22-24Õs ÉdÜ
tadÜ ¦xonta; De Part. Anim. 640b22-27).
Hence, when Aristotle says at Z.11, 1036b22-24,  that not ÒallÓ things
can be de￿ ned without mentioning matter and explains that 
(i) the de￿ nition of ÒsomeÓ things must mention matter
Òfor
(ii) some things are this form in this matter,Ó20
he  is  repeating  what  was  already  said  in  chapters  7  and  10.  The  justi-
￿ cation (ii) offers in support of (i) shows that the things mentioned in (i)
as de￿ nable only in terms of matter are composites of Òthis form in this
matter.Ó (ii) offers no support for the view that things which are not Òthis
form in this matter,Ó e.g. forms, are to be de￿ ned in terms of matter. The
difference between composites and forms is, of course, crucial to the entire
argument  of  Z.10-11,  with  Aristotle  emphasizing  throughout  that  many
terms  referring  to  concrete  objects  can  be  understood  to  refer either  to 
the composite or to the form alone.
21 If, as Aristotle says in 1036b22-24,
it is the fact that something is Òthis form in this matter,Ó viz. a composite,
which justi￿ es the assertion that the itemÕs de￿ nition must refer to matter,
and if the de￿ nition of forms must be distinguished from the de￿ nition of
composites, then the implication is that the de￿ nitions of items which are
not cases of Òthis form in this matterÓ should not refer to matter.
19 My view of the passage is set out in an appendix.
20 ¦nia gŒr àsvw tñd’ ¤n tÒdƒ ¤stÜn µ ÈdÜ tadÜ ¦xonta. Cf. 1041a26-27, 1041a32-b9.
21 1033b17-18, 1035a6-17, b1-3. Cf. the start of H. 3. Passages where such a term
refers to a form alone: 1032a18, 23, 1033a27-28, 29, 33, b9, 1034b11, 1035a9-11 (cf.
14-16), 1036a1, 17, 18, 1037a7-8. Cf. De Caelo 278a13-15, De Gen. et Corr. 321b22-
23, 33.
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Aristotle  (Z.11,  1036b22-32)  explains  that  animal (or  man)  must  be
de￿ ned in terms of material parts, the animal in question is said to be per-
ceptible (1036b28-29). We know from H.3, 1043a34-37 that ÒanimalÓ can
signify  either soul (cf. 1036a17)  or soul in body. Since a soul is imper-
ceptible  (Top.  126a22-24),  the  perceptible  animal  mentioned  at  Z.11,
1036b28-29  is the composite of soul in body (Òthis form in this matterÓ
or Òthis matter disposed  thusÓ) and not the soul, i.e. the form, alone.  So
the  animal  and  man  which  Z.11,  1036b22-23  says  must  be  de￿ ned  in
terms of material parts is the composite substance, not the form.
Frede and Patzig alter the text at 1036b28  from ÒaÞsyhtñnÓ to ÒaÞsyh-
tikñnÓ so that 1036b28-29  says not that the animal to be de￿ ned is per-
ceptible but that it is able to perceive. There are at least four reasons for
rejecting this emendation. (1) It is not found in any manuscripts. (2) ÒaÞ-
syhtñnÓ recurs  in  the  immediately  following  passage  (1036b32-1037a5) 
where it appears to refer back to the present passage. And there the per-
ceptibility  of  the  parts  of  an  object  is  tied  to  the  question  of  whether 
the de￿ nitions of the parts occur in the de￿ nition of the whole.22 (3) While
Frede  and  Patzig  refer23 to  1035b18  for  support,  the  true  parallel  with
Z.11Õs discussion  is  Meta. E.1,  1025b30-1026a6,  where Aristotle  distin-
guishes items which are and items which are not de￿ ned in terms of matter
on the basis of the fact that the former do and the latter do not contain
Òperceptible matterÓ (1025b34).  This fact is then – as in Z.11, 1036b28-
29 – linked  to the fact that the composites  containing  perceptible matter
are  inde￿ nable  apart  from  change  (1026a2-3).  Since  E.1  connects  the
de￿ nition of certain entities to these entitiesÕ perceptibility, it is not accept-
able  to  alter the  text  of  Z.11  so  as  to  avoid  what,  according  to  all  our
manuscripts, is the same connection at 1036b28-30.
24
(4) Their reason for rejecting  ÒaÞsyhtñnÓ is inadequate.  They say that
if Aristotle  is saying  that the  de￿ nition  of animal must  mention matter,
then he is here failing to note the difference in the relations between matter
and form in the case of living things and in the case of artifacts, since the
latter also contain perceptible matter. They claim that the reference to a
22 Note, however, that the presumption of the argument in 1036b32-34 is that the
fact that a part is perceptible is a reason for excluding its de￿ nition from the de￿ nition
of the whole. I take this to con￿ rm that the previous passage does not question the
point that wholes which do not contain perceptible parts, viz. forms, are not de￿ ned
in terms of perceptible parts.
23 Frede and Patzig, p. 210.
24 Cf. J. Whiting, ÒMetasubstance,Ó pp. 627, 630-31. 
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difference that the matter of an animal is an ensouled body  not capable
of surviving  the  animalÕs death  in the way  an  artifactÕs matter can sur-
vive the artifactÕs destruction.25
But  there is  no  reason  why  this difference between  artifacts and  ani-
mals must affect the point  Aristotle is making here. The crucial point is
that  Aristotle  uses  the  example  of  the  hand  to  support  the  contention
(1036b29-30) that an animal cannot be de￿ ned Òwithout its parts being in
a certain condition.Ó But it is equally true that one cannot de￿ ne an arti-
fact without Òits parts being  in a certain condition.Ó One cannot make a
house out of mercury or air. The form of a house can only be realized in
matter that is Òin a certain condition.Ó Since Aristotle is using the exam-
ple of an animal in the passage, he explains the way in which the matter
of a hand must be in a certain condition in the case of animals. The fact
that the  speci￿ c explanation  of why the  matter of animals must be in a
certain condition  does not apply  to artifacts does not mean that  there is
not  some other  explanation  of why  the  matter of artifacts must  be  in  a
certain condition for the forms of artifacts to exist.
That the difference between artifacts and living things which Frede and
Patzig appeal to is not relevant to AristotleÕs point is supported  by H. 2.
There, when Aristotle explains that de￿ nitions of composites refer to their
matter, he compares the de￿ nitions of composite living substances and arti-
facts by saying: ÒJust as in the case of substances [i.e., living things] what
is  predicated  of  matter  is  the  actuality  itself,  thus  in  other  de￿ nitionsÓ
(1043a5-7),  including de￿ nitions of artifacts.
Frede and  Patzig appeal to  1037a21f.26 as support  for the  claims that
matter is mentioned in no de￿ nition, and that Aristotle does not speak of
a de￿ nition of the composite other than a de￿ nition of the essence of the
composite.
27 But  this  appeal  is  not  convincing  since  1037a21f.  is  con-
25 Frede and Patzig, p. 210. 
26 Frede and Patzig, p. 190; cf. p. 211; M. Frede, ÒThe De￿ nition of Sensible Substance
in Metaphysics Z,Ó  pp.  116-17. Morrison agrees (ÒSome  Remarks  on  De￿ nition in
Metaphysics Z,Ó p. 137), and so thinks Aristotle here contradicts his earlier contention
that the de￿ nition of the composite refers to matter. I disagree with Morrison in that
I do not think that Aristotle believes that a de￿ nition of a composite speci￿ es only its
essence. I take Aristotle to identify the essence of a composite such as a man with the
essence of its soul, as in 1043b2-4. Here  man,  i.e the composite of soul and  body
(1043a34-35), is distinguished from the essence of man (i.e. soul) and has a different
de￿ nition (1043a36-37). 
27 Cf. D. Bostock, AristotleÕs Metaphysics: Books Z and H, p. 151.
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kaÜ pÇw  aétò  kayƒ  aêtñ, kayñlou perÜ pantòw eàrhtai, . . .  – 1037a21-23).
The context  (1037a21-b5)  focuses entirely on the topic of essence, sum-
marizing main points which have been established during the examination
of essence in Z.4-6 and 10-11. Aristotle begins by noting that it has been
explained  what  essence  is  and  how  it  exists  in  itself  (a21-22).  He  then
(a22-33) discusses the de￿ nition of essence and ￿ nally (a33-b7) considers
the question  of the identity  of essence with certain items. This focus on
essence  in summing up  the preceding  chapters of Z is hardly  surprising
since  essence  is  one  of  the  four  main  candidates  for primary  substance
(1028b34), and at the beginning of Z.4, the start of the discussion which
he now summarizes, he pointed  out that it was the topic of essence that
was to be examined. 
In the section of 1037a21f. on de￿ nition (a22-33), Aristotle explains that
the de￿ nition of the essence of a form (õ lñgow õ toè tÛ ·n eänai, a22-24)
will mention its parts while the de￿ nition of the essence of a composite
will not mention its material parts.28 The de￿ nition of the essence of the
composite man, for example, will not mention the material parts of a man
because the essence of a man is its soul (1043b2-4), and so this de￿ nition
will not mention the matter of a man for the same reason that the de￿ -
nition of the soul will not mention the matter of a man. 
In a27-28, Aristotle goes on to say that, in a way, however, there will
not be a de￿ nition of the essence of the composite in that no such de￿ -
nition (i.e., no de￿ nition of the essence of a composite) will mention the
material parts of the composite. Although this sentence (a27-28) only uses
the term ÒlñgowÓ and not the entire phrase õ lñgow õ toè tÛ ·n eänai, since
the entire passage  is about  essence, and a22-24  does speak  explicitly  of 
õ lñgow õ toè tÛ ·n eänai, it is reasonable to assume that a27-28 refers only
to the de￿ nition of essence.
If  I  am  correct,  then  1037a22-33  does  not  show  that  there  is  no
28 Similarly, as throughout Z.10-11, it is the pair Òform – compositeÓ that is in ques-
tion in the last section of the passage (a33-b7), where Aristotle says that a form is
identical to its essence while a composite is not identical to its essence.
The passage indicates that there are at least three different cases of de￿ nition that
must be distinguished: (i) the de￿ nition of the essence of a  form, which is what  a
de￿ nition of  a  form  will  always amount to; (ii) the  de￿ nition of  the  essence of  a 
composite, which will display only the form, i.e. the essence, of the composite (cf.
1043b2-3); (iii) the de￿ nition of a composite which will not merely display its essence
but the matter in which the essence is realized.
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the de￿ nition of the essence of an item, where that item is in some cases
a  form  and  in  other  cases  a  composite  of  form  and  matter  (a22-24).
1037a27-28Õs assertion  that the de￿ nition  of the essence of a composite
does not mention matter does not show that there is not some other kind
of de￿ nition  of the composite that does mention matter. Since 1037a21-
b7 is summarizing the discussion  which Aristotle has just carried out in
Z.4-6 and Z.10-11, and since that discussion has focused on the notion of
essence, it is not surprising  that AristotleÕs r￿sum￿ of the preceding  dis-
cussion does not refer to de￿ nition of composites as well as to the de￿ ni-
tion of essence.
The same point applies to 1035b31-34.  There Aristotle says that Òonly
parts of the form are parts of the de￿ nition,Ó but he is thinking solely of
de￿ nitions of forms. Similarly, at 1035a19-21 he asserts that material parts
are not parts of the form or of the de￿ nition just before he explains that
the de￿ nition of material parts will occur in the de￿ nitions of some things
(1035a22-23).  On the other hand, when Aristotle says in H.6, 1045a 33-
35 that ÒOf matter, one kind is intelligible  and another kind is percepti-
ble, and it is always the case that one part of the de￿ nition is matter and
another part actuality,Ó he is thinking  of de￿ nitions  of composites  alone
despite the Òalways.Ó Thus, he goes on to say (1045a36):  ÒBut whatever
things do not have matter, either intelligible or perceptible . . .Ó.
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1035A22-B3:
Aristotle has distinguished  parts (1) of a form from material parts (2) of
the composite.
A. 1035a22-23
The de￿ nitions of composites differ from the de￿ nitions of forms:
1. The de￿ nition  of material parts (2) will occur  in the de￿ nition  of
composite substances.
2. The de￿ nition of material parts (2) will not occur in the de￿ nition
of forms. 
B. 1035a24-31
Because of (A1):
In the case of composites such as the bronze circle:
1. Material parts (2) are parts (2) of the composites.
2. Material parts (2) are principles of the composites.
3. Composite substances are constituted from material parts (2).
4. Composite substances perish into material parts (2) from which
they are constituted as principles. 
Because of (A2):
In the case of forms, whose de￿ nitions  (by contrast) are of the form
alone: 
1. Material parts (2) are not parts (1) of the forms.
2. Material parts (2) are not principles of the forms. 
3. Forms are not constituted from material parts (2).
4. Either: 
1. Forms do not perish at all, or
2. Forms do not perish into material parts (2) from which they
are composed as principles.
C. 1035a31-b3
Because of what (A) and (B) state about composites, they perish into
their matter.
Examples: 
1. The clay statue perishes into clay.
2. The bronze sphere perishes into bronze.
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4. The circle perishes into its segments.
1. For there is a kind of circle which is combined with matter.
2. For  both  the  circle  simply  – the  form  – and  the  particular 
circle – the composite – are called a circle.
3. For  the  name  is  not  applied  only  to  particular  circles,  i.e. 
composites.
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